A story by Stephen Pharell and Ammar Karim in the New York Times this morning reports that there is a lot of good news coming out of Basra. It seems the Iraqi Army (with U.S. and British support) has calmed the city, largely ridding it of the harsh fundamentalist influence and violence of Moktadr al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army. This is good news, of a sort.
It is also bad news for several reasons.
1) Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is closely aligned with the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (formerly known as the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq – Hmmm, I wonder why they changed the name?). Arguably the most powerful political party in Iraq, their power base is in the oil-rich southern part of the country, particularly Basra. Why is this bad? Because SIIC is a proxy for Iran, as, one suspects, is al-Maliki. By aiding this effort to stabilize Basra (and rid the town of al-Sadr), we hand full control to the SIIC and move their government and this oil-rich region closer to Iran.
2) The gains are temporary. They occurred largely after a cease fire was declared, and without continued resistance from al-Sadr. The article is deliberate in emphasizing the tenuousness of the peace, a fact well recognized by the city’s citizens. It is premature to see this as a significant victory.
3) Basra was supposed to be the easy city, remember? Back when the British had control of the town, there was very little violence and Basra was often referenced as an example of how well our efforts in Iraq were working. What happened? Well, parliamentary elections are coming up. The move to eliminate the Mahdi Army is likely an effort consolidate political power for SIIC and al-Maliki. See #1 for why this is bad.
The big question is, who is the greater danger to the U.S. in the long run? al-Sadr or the SIIC?
To me, it isn’t at all clear that we are helping ourselves by helping SIIC. And this is the fundamental, intractable problem in Iraq. Helping al-Sadr isn’t an alternative either. In Iraq, we are damned if we do, and damned if we don’t.
Monday, May 12, 2008 at 7:44 pm |
Actually, here’s Middle East expert Nibras Kazimi:
“As a result of being unable to rely on Mr. Sadr’s organization, Iran would lose a menacing avenue for retaliation against America should Iran’s illicit nuclear program get attacked.
Basra had a moment of clarity, illuminating the convergence of several positive trends in Iraq. What’s driving these trends is a sense among regular Iraqis that their state has outlasted its challengers, whether they are Sunni insurgents, organized crime cartels, or hostile regional powers. Basra is “Exhibit A” for those who argue that Iraq’s remaining problems are fixable, that the achievements seen so far are irreversible, and that a sense of patriotic cohesion is salvageable and viable.
Consequently, the events in Basra do not sit well with those who have argued otherwise and staked their careers and credibility to the storyline that Iraq is irredeemable, such as the many journalists and pundits who have been covering Iraq over the last five years. This has seemingly induced them to fabricate a negative and false narrative in the hope that their predictions would go unchallenged…”
Monday, May 12, 2008 at 7:52 pm |
A couple of things. No one is shedding tears of the disappearance of the Mahdi Army. But the Mahdi Army hasn’t been destroyed. It’s sleeping. Iran’s ability to use al-Sadr’s militia is lying dormant.
I read Kazimi today in the NY Sun. He makes a tenuous connection between Basra and Lebanon through Iran. The problem is that the people who have most gained by the quieting of al-Sadr are the SIIC and al-Maliki – Shiites, who are more closely aligned with Iran than they are with the United States.
This is indisputable.
The point here is that there is no winning path. No good options. You can say that Iraq is redeemable, but that all depends on what you mean by redemption.
Wednesday, May 28, 2008 at 10:00 am |
[...] good options for a successful resolution. We can support al-Maliki and the SIIC until they’re tucked in bed with the Iranians (our enemy, lest you forget) and pay the Sunnis not to fight with endless borrowed billions [...]